- The Political Economy of (Lacking) Commitment to Green Policies, 2025, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 125, 103133, with Josse Delfgaauw, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2025.103133. 

- The Political Climate Trap, 2024, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 124, 102935, with Josse Delfgaauw, (https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0095069624000093).

- Left Behind Voters, Anti-Elitism, and Popular Will, 2024, Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 19(2), 127-156, with Benoit Crutzen, and Dana Sisak.

- Committees as Active Audiences: Reputation Concerns and Information Acquisition, 2023, Journal of Public Economics, 221, 104875, with Bauke Visser, (https://authors.elsevier.com/sd/article/S0047272723000579). 

- Labor Market Quotas when Promotions are Signals, 2021, Journal of Labor Economics, 39, 437-460, with Suzanne Bijkerk, Silvia Dominguez-Martinez, and Jurjen Kamphorst, (https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/pdf/10.1086/710358).

- Don't Demotivate, Discriminate, 2016, American Economic Journal, Microeconomics, 8(1), 140-165, with Jurjen Kamphorst.

- Learning from Others? Decision Rights, Strategic Communication and Reputational Concerns, 2015, American Economic Journal, Microeconomics, 7(4), 109-149, with Bauke Visser.

- A Simple Model of Self Assessment, 2009, Economic Journal, 119, 1225-1241, with Silvia Dominguez-Martinez.

- How Committees of Experts Interact with the Outside World: Some Theory and Evidence from the FOMC, Journal of European Economic Association, 6, 478-486, with Job Swank and Bauke Visser.

- On Committees of Experts, 2007, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 122(1), 337-372, with Bauke Visser.

- Producing and Manipulating Information, 2005, Economic Journal, 115, 185-199, with Robert Dur.

- On the bad Reputation of Reputational Concerns, 2004, Journal of Public Economics, 88, 2817-2838, with Guido Suurmond and Bauke Visser.

- Voting on the Budget Deficit, A Comment, 1999, American Economic Review, 1377-1381, with Robert Dur and Ben Peletier.  

Recent Working Papers

- Electoral Incentives and Efforts to Obtain EU Grants (with Linda Veiga and Francisco Veiga). Resubmitted to  Economic Journal.

Abstract: Political agency models predict that electoral concerns induce politicians to put effort into making policies that benefit citizens. We exploit the introduction of mayoral term limits in Portugal to investigate how electoral incentives affect incumbents' efforts to obtain EU grants. We focus on EU grants because getting them requires effort. Moreover, by obtaining EU grants, mayors can do more for their citizens. We focus on Portugal because it provides a quasi-natural experimental setting to determine the causal effect of electoral incentives on effort. We find that term-limited mayors receive about 30\% less EU money than mayors eligible for reelection.

- Trust and Policy Capacity (with Dana Sisak)

Abstract: We investigate the determinants of states' policy capacity, defined as the ability of states to craft effective policies. Our model reveals that the interaction between politicians' implementation decisions and bureaucrats' motivation to design good policies can result in the coexistence of high-trust and low-trust equilibria. Without electoral concerns, politicians favor high-trust equilibria and hire capable bureaucrats. In a polarized society, electoral concerns may prompt more policy-skeptical politicians to appoint less capable bureaucrats to diminish policy capacity and ensure low-trust equilibria. This strategy shifts future implementation decisions of interventionist politicians in their favor. Moreover, it reduces voters' demand for interventionist decision-making.

Work in Progress

- An Informational Rationale for Political Campaigns. With Jori Korpershoek.

Abstract: Existing theoretical and empirical research has a dim view of campaigns: they are distractions at best and exercises in vote buying at worst. We study a setting in which citizens are rational, but imperfectly informed, and where elections serve three goals: aggregating preferences, aggregating information, and selecting good politicians. We highlight two essential roles of campaigning. First, campaigning allows candidates to tell voters what they intend to do while elected. Second, during the campaign, candidates present themselves to citizens, so citizens can learn about the capabilities of politicians that are relevant to their functioning. Without campaigns, voters learn preciously little about politicians or platforms and elections cannot achieve the aforementioned goals. We then extend our model to explore (1) when politicians commit to their platform, when they remain ambiguous and how this affects issue salience, (2) how campaigns determine when elections revolve around personality and when around policy and (3) when politicians can claim an electoral mandate for their platform.

- An Empirically Inspired Theory of Turnout and Voting. With Rubén Poblete Cazenave.

Abstract: Why another theoretical model of voter behavior? First, recent empirical studies provide new insights into the drivers of people's turnout and vote decisions. Second, existing voter models predominantly focus on turnout decisions and often ignore vote decisions. This leads to inconsistent explanations of observed voting patterns. We build on Harbaugh (1996), who theoretically explored social image concerns as drivers of turnout decisions. Our model explains turnout, lying about abstaining, and vote decisions. Its predictions are consistent with studies on the effects of information about candidates in slums in a large city in India. Furthermore, the model casts new light on recent studies on expressive and strategic voting in elections in France and Germany. Finally, the model yields a variety of new testable predictions.

- Coalition Formation in Parliamentary Democracies. 

Abstract: The composition of governments in parliamentary democracies varies widely across countries and over time. In some countries, minority governments are rare, while in other countries, they are common. Furthermore, in many countries, the runner-up party rarely participates in the government. Instead, the biggest party typically forms a coalition with the third- and/or fourth-biggest party. We develop a model that explains these empirical observations. The model focuses on two prominent features of parliamentary democracy. First, after an election, the biggest party can take the initiative to form a cabinet. Second, the government resigns if a majority of parliament supports a non-confidence vote. In our model, all parties want a competent government. Furthermore, parties care about the groups they represent. We find that in environments in which governing is relatively easy, majority governments are formed with the runner-up party in the opposition. In relatively hard times, the two biggest parties possibly form the government. Finally, minority governments are formed in relatively uncertain environments. 

Publications (1999-)