Main Publications

- Labor Market Quotas when Promotions are Signals, 2021, Journal of Labor Economics, 39, 437-460, with Suzanne Bijkerk, Silvia Dominguez-Martinez and Jurjen Kamphorst.

- Don't Demotivate, Discriminate, 2016, American Economic Journal, Microeconomics, 8(1), 140-165, with Jurjen Kamphorst.

- Learning from Others? Decision Rights, Strategic Communication and Reputational Concerns, 2015, American Economic Journal, Microeconomics, 7(4), 109-149, with Bauke Visser.

- A Simple Model of Self Assessment, 2009, Economic Journal, 119, 1225-1241, with Silvia Dominguez-Martinez.

- On Committees of Experts, 2007, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 122(1), 337-372, with Bauke Visser.

- Producing and Manipulating Information, 2005, Economic Journal, 115, 185-199, with Robert Dur.

- Voting on the Budget Deficit, A Comment, 1999, American Economic Review, 1377-1381, with Robert Dur and Ben Peletier.  

Recent Working Papers

- A Theoretical Approach to Political Trust (submitted)

Abstract: We model political trust by adding a pollster to a political-accountability model. The pollster asks citizens about their personal trust in government at different points in time. We assume that citizens respond by reporting their Bayesian beliefs about whether the government acts well. Politicians and experts are involved in the making of policy. We distinguish three dimensions of trust: intention, competence, and incentives. Our model shows how and why political trust depends on the freedom of the press and why in countries with higher levels of trust, bad outcomes lead to less political turnover. Our model generates testable predictions of how in low-trust and high-trust countries, political trust evolves over the electoral cycle.

 

 - Left Behind Voters, Anti-Elitism, and Popular Will  (with Benoit Crutzen and Dana Sisak) (submitted).

Abstract: Two common characteristics of populism are anti-elitism and favoring popular will over expertise. The recent successes of populists are often attributed  to the common people, the majority of voters, being left behind by mainstream parties. This paper shows that the two characteristics of populism are responses to the common people being left behind. We develop a model that highlights two forces behind electoral success: numbers and knowledge.Numbers give the common people an electoral advantage, knowledge the elite. We show that electoral competition may lead parties to cater to the elite's interest, creating a left-behind majority. Next, we identify conditions under which a left-behind majority encourages entry by a party offering an anti-elite platform. Finally, we identify conditions under which parties follow the opinion of the common people when that group would benefit from parties relying on experts.

 

Committees as Active Audiences: Reputation Concerns and Information Acquisition (with Bauke Visser) (submitted).

Abstract: We study committees that acquire information, deliberate, and vote. A member cares about state-dependent decision payoffs and his reputation for expertise. The state remains unobserved. In such environments, members' internal reputations are based on deliberation patterns, while members' external reputations are based on the observed group decision. We find that either form of reputation concerns creates strategic complementarity among members' effort levels. Internal reputations create stronger incentives to become informed than external reputations. Their strength grows in committee size; external reputations create no incentives in large committees. Finally, reputation concerns may relax participation constraints.

 

- Do politicians properly commit to policies combating climate change? (with Josse Delfgaauw) (first draft below)

Abstract: In the wake of climate change, governments use a wide variety of policies to encourage citizens and firms to invest in windmills, solar panels, nuclear power plants, or green cars. The return on such investments often depends on future policies, which can raise time-inconsistency problems. This paper examines whether politicians have incentives to choose the socially optimal degree of commitment. We show that politicians' distributional concerns can alleviate or aggravate the commitment problem. In turn, politicians either commit too heavily or not at all. This explains the existence of very long-term contracts on the one hand and lack of initiatives on the other. We also show that if both the social value of investment and uncertainty are high, politicians may achieve higher efficiency than a social planner.

 

Trust 5 Jan 2021
PDF – 437,9 KB 219 downloads
Populism 03 14 2021
PDF – 302,7 KB 195 downloads
Committee 4 4 2022
PDF – 233,9 KB 20 downloads
Commit 13 4 22
PDF – 203,0 KB 20 downloads

Work in Progress

 

An Empirically Inspired Theory of Turnout and Voting. With Rubén Poblete Cazenave.

Abstract: Why another theoretical model of voter behavior? First, recent empirical studies provide new insights into the drivers of people's turnout and vote decisions. Second, existing voter models predominantly focus on turnout decisions and often ignore vote decisions. This leads to inconsistent explanations of observed voting patterns. We build on Harbaugh (1996), who theoretically explored social image concerns as drivers of turnout decisions. Our model explains turnout, lying about abstaining, and vote decisions. Its predictions are consistent with studies on the effects of information about candidates in slums in a large city in India. Furthermore, the model casts new light on recent studies on expressive and strategic voting in elections in France and Germany. Finally, the model yields a variety of new testable predictions.

Some Other Publications

-- Pride and Shame in Voting: A Social Image Theory of Information Acquisition, Opinion Formation, and Voting, 2022, European Journal of Political Economics, with Vladimir Karamychev.

- Labor Market Quotas when Promotions are Signals, 2021, Journal of Labor Economics, 39, 437-460, with Suzanne Bijkerk, Silvia Dominguez-Martinez and Jurjen Kamphorst.

- The Role of Performance Appraisals in Motivating Employees, 2018, Journal of Economics, and Management Strategy, 27, 251-269, with Jurjen Kamhorst.

- When Words are not enough, 2018, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 149, 294-314, with Suzanne Bijkerk and Vladimir Karamychev.

- Task-specific Human Capital and Organizational Inertia, 2016, Journal of Economics, and Management Strategy, 25, 608-626 (with Josse Delfgaauw).

- Don't Demotivate, Discriminate, 2016, American Economic Journal, Microeconomics, 8(1), 140-165, with Jurjen Kamphorst.

- Learning from Others? Decision Rights, Strategic Communication and Reputational Concerns, 2015, American Economic Journal, Microeconomics, 7(4), 109-149, with Bauke Visser.

- When Galitea Cares about her Reputation, 2013, European Economic Review, 60, 91-104, with Jurjen Kamphorst.

- Confidence Management on Interpersonal Comparisons in Teams,  2013, Journal of Economics, and Management Strategy, 22, 744-767, with Benoit Crutzen and Bauke Visser.

- Is Transparency to no Avail?, 2013, Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 115, 967-994, with Bauke Visser.

- Why are Junior Doctors Reluctant to Consult Attending Physicians?, 2010, Journal of Health Economics, 29, 191-332. 

- A Simple Model of Self Assessment, 2009, Economic Journal, 119, 1225-1241, with Silvia Dominguez-Martinez.

- How Committees of Experts Interact with the Outside World: Some Theory and Evidence from the FOMC, Journal of European Economic Association, 6, 478-486, with Job Swank and Bauke Visser.

- The Consequences of Endogenizing Information for the Performance of a Sequential Decision Procedure, 2008, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 65, 667-681.

- In Defense of Boards, 2008, Journal of Economics, Management and Strategy, 17, 667-682.

- On Committees of Experts, 2007, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 122(1), 337-372, with Bauke Visser.

- Motivating Through Delegating Taks or Giving Attention, 2007 Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 731-742, with Bauke Visser.

- Policy Makers, Advisers, and Reputation, 2007, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 62, 570-590, with Phongthorn Wrasai.

- Polarization, Information Collection and Electoral Control, 2006, Social, Choice and Welfare, 26, 527-545, with Silvia Dominguez Martinez.

- Producing and Manipulating Information, 2005, Economic Journal, 115, 185-199, with Robert Dur.

- On the Composition of Committees, 2004, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 20, 353-378, with Klaas Beniers.

- On the bad Reputation of Reputational Concerns, 2004, Journal of Public Economics, 88, 2817-2838.

- Polarization, Political Instability and Active Learning, 2003, Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 105, 1-14, with Ioulia Ossokina.

- When Policy Advisors Cannot Reach a Consensus, 2000, Social Choice and Welfare, 17, 439-461, with Harry van Dalen and Wilko Letterie.

- A Theory of Policy Advice, 1999, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 10, 85-103, with Harry van Dalen and Wilko Letterie.

- Voting on the Budget Deficit, A Comment, 1999, American Economic Review, 1377-1381, with Robert Dur and Ben Peletier.