- Left Behind Voters, Anti-Elitism, and Popular Will, forthcoming,  Quarterly Journal of Political Science, with Benoit Crutzen, and Dana Sisak.

- Committees as Active Audiences: Reputation Concerns and Information Acquisition, 2023, Journal of Public Economics, 221, 104875, with Bauke Visser (https://authors.elsevier.com/sd/article/S0047272723000579). 

- Labor Market Quotas when Promotions are Signals, 2021, Journal of Labor Economics, 39, 437-460, with Suzanne Bijkerk, Silvia Dominguez-Martinez, and Jurjen Kamphorst (https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/pdf/10.1086/710358).

- Don't Demotivate, Discriminate, 2016, American Economic Journal, Microeconomics, 8(1), 140-165, with Jurjen Kamphorst.

- Learning from Others? Decision Rights, Strategic Communication and Reputational Concerns, 2015, American Economic Journal, Microeconomics, 7(4), 109-149, with Bauke Visser.

- A Simple Model of Self Assessment, 2009, Economic Journal, 119, 1225-1241, with Silvia Dominguez-Martinez.

- How Committees of Experts Interact with the Outside World: Some Theory and Evidence from the FOMC, Journal of European Economic Association, 6, 478-486, with Job Swank and Bauke Visser.

- On Committees of Experts, 2007, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 122(1), 337-372, with Bauke Visser.

- Producing and Manipulating Information, 2005, Economic Journal, 115, 185-199, with Robert Dur.

- On the bad Reputation of Reputational Concerns, 2004, Journal of Public Economics, 88, 2817-2838, with Guido Suurmond and Bauke Visser.

- Voting on the Budget Deficit, A Comment, 1999, American Economic Review, 1377-1381, with Robert Dur and Ben Peletier.  

Recent Working Papers

- The Gasoline Climate Trap (with Josse Delfgaauw). Submitted.

Abstract: Due to taxes and subsidies, gasoline prices vary dramatically across countries. Externalities cannot fully account for this. We develop a simple political-economic model that shows that group interests, resulting from the composition of a country's car fleet, help to explain differences in gasoline taxes even among countries with identical fundamentals. In the model, citizens' car ownership is endogenous, which can yield multiple equilibria. Our model demonstrates the possibility of a society in a climate trap where a low gasoline tax reflects the views of a majority, but another majority would benefit from transitioning to an equilibrium with a higher gasoline tax and fewer emissions.

- A Theoretical Approach to Political Trust (R&R JTP)

Abstract: We model political trust by adding a pollster to a political-accountability model. The pollster asks citizens about their personal trust in government at different points in time. We assume that citizens respond by reporting their Bayesian beliefs about whether the government acts well. Politicians and experts are involved in the making of policy. We distinguish three dimensions of trust: intention, competence, and incentives. Our model shows how and why political trust depends on the freedom of the press and why in countries with higher levels of trust, bad outcomes lead to less political turnover. Our model generates testable predictions of how in low-trust and high-trust countries, political trust evolves over the electoral cycle.

- Do politicians properly commit to policies combating climate change? (with Josse Delfgaauw) 

Abstract: In the wake of climate change, governments use a wide variety of policies to encourage citizens and firms to invest in windmills, solar panels, nuclear power plants, or green cars. The return on such investments often depends on future policies, which can raise time-inconsistency problems. This paper examines whether politicians have incentives to choose the socially optimal degree of commitment. We show that politicians' distributional concerns can alleviate or aggravate the commitment problem. In turn, politicians either commit too heavily or not at all. This explains the existence of very long-term contracts on the one hand and lack of initiatives on the other. We also show that if both the social value of investment and uncertainty are high, politicians may achieve higher efficiency than a social planner.

Work in Progress

- An Empirically Inspired Theory of Turnout and Voting. With Rubén Poblete Cazenave.

Abstract: Why another theoretical model of voter behavior? First, recent empirical studies provide new insights into the drivers of people's turnout and vote decisions. Second, existing voter models predominantly focus on turnout decisions and often ignore vote decisions. This leads to inconsistent explanations of observed voting patterns. We build on Harbaugh (1996), who theoretically explored social image concerns as drivers of turnout decisions. Our model explains turnout, lying about abstaining, and vote decisions. Its predictions are consistent with studies on the effects of information about candidates in slums in a large city in India. Furthermore, the model casts new light on recent studies on expressive and strategic voting in elections in France and Germany. Finally, the model yields a variety of new testable predictions.

- Coalition Formation in Parliamentary Democracies. With Dana Sisak.

Abstract: The composition of governments in parliamentary democracies varies widely across countries and over time. In some countries, minority governments are rare, while in other countries, they are common. Furthermore, in many countries, the runner-up party rarely participates in the government. Instead, the biggest party typically forms a coalition with the third- and/or fourth-biggest party. We develop a model that explains these empirical observations. The model focuses on two prominent features of parliamentary democracy. First, after an election, the biggest party can take the initiative to form a cabinet. Second, the government resigns if a majority of parliament supports a non-confidence vote. In our model, all parties want a competent government. Furthermore, parties care about the groups they represent. We find that in environments in which governing is relatively easy, majority governments are formed with the runner-up party in the opposition. In relatively hard times, the two biggest parties possibly form the government. Finally, minority governments are formed in relatively uncertain environments. 

Some Other Publications