Main Publications

- Left Behind Voters, Anti-Elitism, and Popular Will, 2024, Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 19(2), 127-156, with Benoit Crutzen, and Dana Sisak.

- Committees as Active Audiences: Reputation Concerns and Information Acquisition, 2023, Journal of Public Economics, 221, 104875, with Bauke Visser (https://authors.elsevier.com/sd/article/S0047272723000579). 

- Labor Market Quotas when Promotions are Signals, 2021, Journal of Labor Economics, 39, 437-460, with Suzanne Bijkerk, Silvia Dominguez-Martinez, and Jurjen Kamphorst (https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/pdf/10.1086/710358).

- Don't Demotivate, Discriminate, 2016, American Economic Journal, Microeconomics, 8(1), 140-165, with Jurjen Kamphorst.

- Learning from Others? Decision Rights, Strategic Communication and Reputational Concerns, 2015, American Economic Journal, Microeconomics, 7(4), 109-149, with Bauke Visser.

- A Simple Model of Self Assessment, 2009, Economic Journal, 119, 1225-1241, with Silvia Dominguez-Martinez.

- How Committees of Experts Interact with the Outside World: Some Theory and Evidence from the FOMC, Journal of European Economic Association, 6, 478-486, with Job Swank and Bauke Visser.

- On Committees of Experts, 2007, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 122(1), 337-372, with Bauke Visser.

- Producing and Manipulating Information, 2005, Economic Journal, 115, 185-199, with Robert Dur.

- On the bad Reputation of Reputational Concerns, 2004, Journal of Public Economics, 88, 2817-2838, with Guido Suurmond and Bauke Visser.

- Voting on the Budget Deficit, A Comment, 1999, American Economic Review, 1377-1381, with Robert Dur and Ben Peletier.  

Recent Working Papers

Electoral Incentives and Efforts to Obtain EU Grants (with Linda Veiga and Francisco Veiga)

Abstract: Political accountability models predict that electoral concerns induce politicians to put effort into making policies that benefit citizens. We apply a difference-in-differences approach to investigate how term limits affect Portuguese majors' incentives to apply for EU grants. We focus on EU grants because getting them requires substantial effort. Moreover, by obtaining EU grants, mayors can do more for their citizens without raising taxes. We focus on Portugal because it provides a quasi-natural experimental setting to determine the causal effect of electoral incentives on effort. We find that term-limited mayors receive up to 50% less EU money than mayors eligible for reelection.

 

Why Politicians May Seek to Reduce Bureaucracy Quality (with Dana Sisak)

Abstract: A competent and motivated bureaucracy is vital for designing and implementing common good policies. We show how electoral concerns may discourage right-wing politicians from appointing competent bureaucrats. We develop a model where bureaucrats design policies, and politicians decide whether to implement them. When politicians cannot judge the policies designed by bureaucrats, politicians' trust in bureaucrats affects their policy decisions. Conservative politicians may appoint mediocre bureaucrats to lower trust in bureaucrats and, in turn, reduce the opposition's and voters' support for implementing new policies. Our model explains recent empirical findings that conservative politicians ignore expertise when replacing bureaucrats in key positions. 

 

- A Theoretical Approach to Political Trust (R&R JTP)

Abstract: We model political trust by adding a pollster to a political-accountability model. The pollster asks citizens about their personal trust in government at different points in time. We assume that citizens respond by reporting their Bayesian beliefs about whether the government acts well. Politicians and experts are involved in the making of policy. We distinguish three dimensions of trust: intention, competence, and incentives. Our model shows how and why political trust depends on the freedom of the press and why in countries with higher levels of trust, bad outcomes lead to less political turnover. Our model generates testable predictions of how in low-trust and high-trust countries, political trust evolves over the electoral cycle.

 

- The Political Economy of Commitment to Policies (with Josse Delfgaauw). Submitted. 

Abstract: IPCC (2022) documents a looming gap between climate goals and implemented policies and points to a lack of political commitment. We study policymakers' incentives to commit. A policymaker decides on a policy to encourage citizens to make investments and determines the degree of flexibility to change the policy after investments have been made. This adds redistributive concerns to the trade-off between commitment and flexibility. When a majority of citizens invest, redistributive concerns alleviate the time-inconsistency problem. When a minority of citizens invest, redistributive concerns aggravate the time-inconsistency problem. Then, the policymaker either commits too strongly or refrains from commitment altogether.

 

Trust 5 Jan 2021
PDF – 437,9 KB 770 downloads
Term Limits Mayors Port
PDF – 1,1 MB 149 downloads
The Political Economy Of Commitment To Policies
PDF – 305,6 KB 233 downloads

Work in Progress

An Empirically Inspired Theory of Turnout and Voting. With Rubén Poblete Cazenave.

Abstract: Why another theoretical model of voter behavior? First, recent empirical studies provide new insights into the drivers of people's turnout and vote decisions. Second, existing voter models predominantly focus on turnout decisions and often ignore vote decisions. This leads to inconsistent explanations of observed voting patterns. We build on Harbaugh (1996), who theoretically explored social image concerns as drivers of turnout decisions. Our model explains turnout, lying about abstaining, and vote decisions. Its predictions are consistent with studies on the effects of information about candidates in slums in a large city in India. Furthermore, the model casts new light on recent studies on expressive and strategic voting in elections in France and Germany. Finally, the model yields a variety of new testable predictions.

 

- Coalition Formation in Parliamentary Democracies. 

Abstract: The composition of governments in parliamentary democracies varies widely across countries and over time. In some countries, minority governments are rare, while in other countries, they are common. Furthermore, in many countries, the runner-up party rarely participates in the government. Instead, the biggest party typically forms a coalition with the third- and/or fourth-biggest party. We develop a model that explains these empirical observations. The model focuses on two prominent features of parliamentary democracy. First, after an election, the biggest party can take the initiative to form a cabinet. Second, the government resigns if a majority of parliament supports a non-confidence vote. In our model, all parties want a competent government. Furthermore, parties care about the groups they represent. We find that in environments in which governing is relatively easy, majority governments are formed with the runner-up party in the opposition. In relatively hard times, the two biggest parties possibly form the government. Finally, minority governments are formed in relatively uncertain environments. 

 

Some Other Publications

- The Political Climate Trap, 2024, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 124, 102935, with Josse Delfgaauw (https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0095069624000093).

- Left Behind Voters, Anti-Elitism, and Popular Will, 2024,  Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 19(2), 127-156, with Benoit Crutzen and Dana Sisak.

- Committees as Active Audiences: Reputation Concerns and Information Acquisition, 2023, Journal of Public Economics, 221, 104875, with Bauke Visser (https://authors.elsevier.com/sd/article/S0047272723000579). 

- Pride and Shame in Voting: A Social Image Theory of Information Acquisition, Opinion Formation, and Voting, 2022, European Journal of Political Economics, with Vladimir Karamychev (https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0176268021001336).

- Labor Market Quotas when Promotions are Signals, 2021, Journal of Labor Economics, 39, 437-460, with Suzanne Bijkerk, Silvia Dominguez-Martinez and Jurjen Kamphorst (https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/epdf/10.1086/710358 (https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/pdf/10.1086/710358).

- The Role of Performance Appraisals in Motivating Employees, 2018, Journal of Economics, and Management Strategy, 27, 251-269, with Jurjen Kamhorst.

- When Words are not enough, 2018, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 149, 294-314, with Suzanne Bijkerk and Vladimir Karamychev.

- Task-specific Human Capital and Organizational Inertia, 2016, Journal of Economics, and Management Strategy, 25, 608-626 (with Josse Delfgaauw).

- Don't Demotivate, Discriminate, 2016, American Economic Journal, Microeconomics, 8(1), 140-165, with Jurjen Kamphorst.

- Learning from Others? Decision Rights, Strategic Communication and Reputational Concerns, 2015, American Economic Journal, Microeconomics, 7(4), 109-149, with Bauke Visser.

- When Galitea Cares about her Reputation, 2013, European Economic Review, 60, 91-104, with Jurjen Kamphorst.

- Confidence Management on Interpersonal Comparisons in Teams,  2013, Journal of Economics, and Management Strategy, 22, 744-767, with Benoit Crutzen and Bauke Visser.

- Is Transparency to no Avail?, 2013, Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 115, 967-994, with Bauke Visser.

- Why are Junior Doctors Reluctant to Consult Attending Physicians?, 2010, Journal of Health Economics, 29, 191-332. 

- A Simple Model of Self Assessment, 2009, Economic Journal, 119, 1225-1241, with Silvia Dominguez-Martinez.

- How Committees of Experts Interact with the Outside World: Some Theory and Evidence from the FOMC,  2008, Journal of European Economic Association, 6, 478-486, with Job Swank and Bauke Visser.

- The Consequences of Endogenizing Information for the Performance of a Sequential Decision Procedure, 2008, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 65, 667-681.

- In Defense of Boards, 2008, Journal of Economics, Management and Strategy, 17, 667-682.

- On Committees of Experts, 2007, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 122(1), 337-372, with Bauke Visser.

- Motivating Through Delegating Taks or Giving Attention, 2007 Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 731-742, with Bauke Visser.

- Policy Makers, Advisers, and Reputation, 2007, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 62, 570-590, with Phongthorn Wrasai.

- Polarization, Information Collection and Electoral Control, 2006, Social, Choice and Welfare, 26, 527-545, with Silvia Dominguez Martinez.

- Producing and Manipulating Information, 2005, Economic Journal, 115, 185-199, with Robert Dur.

- On the Composition of Committees, 2004, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 20, 353-378, with Klaas Beniers.

- On the bad Reputation of Reputational Concerns, 2004, Journal of Public Economics, 88, 2817-2838, with Guido Suurmond and Bauke Visser.

- Polarization, Political Instability and Active Learning, 2003, Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 105, 1-14, with Ioulia Ossokina.

- When Policy Advisors Cannot Reach a Consensus, 2000, Social Choice and Welfare, 17, 439-461, with Harry van Dalen and Wilko Letterie.

- A Theory of Policy Advice, 1999, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 10, 85-103, with Harry van Dalen and Wilko Letterie.

- Voting on the Budget Deficit, A Comment, 1999, American Economic Review, 1377-1381, with Robert Dur and Ben Peletier.