-  Electoral Incentives and Efforts to Obtain EU Grants, Economic Journal, 136, 1527-1543, with Francisco Veiga and Linda Veiga, .

- The Political Economy of (Lacking) Commitment to Green Policies, 2025, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 125, 103133, with Josse Delfgaauw, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2025.103133. 

- The Political Climate Trap, 2024, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 124, 102935, with Josse Delfgaauw, (https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0095069624000093).

- Left Behind Voters, Anti-Elitism, and Popular Will, 2024, Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 19(2), 127-156, with Benoit Crutzen, and Dana Sisak.

- Committees as Active Audiences: Reputation Concerns and Information Acquisition, 2023, Journal of Public Economics, 221, 104875, with Bauke Visser, (https://authors.elsevier.com/sd/article/S0047272723000579). 

- Labor Market Quotas when Promotions are Signals, 2021, Journal of Labor Economics, 39, 437-460, with Suzanne Bijkerk, Silvia Dominguez-Martinez, and Jurjen Kamphorst, (https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/pdf/10.1086/710358).

- Don't Demotivate, Discriminate, 2016, American Economic Journal, Microeconomics, 8(1), 140-165, with Jurjen Kamphorst.

- Learning from Others? Decision Rights, Strategic Communication and Reputational Concerns, 2015, American Economic Journal, Microeconomics, 7(4), 109-149, with Bauke Visser.

- A Simple Model of Self Assessment, 2009, Economic Journal, 119, 1225-1241, with Silvia Dominguez-Martinez.

- How Committees of Experts Interact with the Outside World: Some Theory and Evidence from the FOMC, Journal of European Economic Association, 6, 478-486, with Job Swank and Bauke Visser.

- On Committees of Experts, 2007, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 122(1), 337-372, with Bauke Visser.

- Producing and Manipulating Information, 2005, Economic Journal, 115, 185-199, with Robert Dur.

- On the bad Reputation of Reputational Concerns, 2004, Journal of Public Economics, 88, 2817-2838, with Guido Suurmond and Bauke Visser.

- Voting on the Budget Deficit, A Comment, 1999, American Economic Review, 1377-1381, with Robert Dur and Ben Peletier.  

Recent Working Papers

- Why Regression Discontinuity Designs Have Often Underestimated the Incumbency Advantage Effect (with Francisco Veiga and Linda Veiga, submitted)

Abstract: The incumbency advantage, the electoral benefit from holding office, is widely estimated using regression discontinuity designs (RDDs). Existing estimates pool first-term and multiple-term incumbents. We show that this pooling attenuates RDD estimates when candidate characteristics contain persistent shocks, such as quality: a multiple-term incumbent who barely wins has already revealed low quality, fully absorbing the incumbency premium. Using U.S. House (1942-2008) and Portuguese municipal elections (1976-2025), estimates for one-term incumbents are 13.5 and 13.9 percentage points versus 7.8 and 3.6 percentage points for multiple-term incumbents. Standard pooled RDD estimates understate the incumbency advantage from first-time officeholding by 20--30 percent.

- How Informative Campaigning Shapes Policy and Performance (with Jori Korpershoek)

Abstract: Conventional wisdom says that moderation is the route to win office. However, recently, many candidates won office because of extreme policy commitments. Moreover, after their election, those politicians governed as hardliners. We present a model of electoral competition in which candidates remain ambiguous during their campaigns or make specific promises. We show that candidates commit to signal the effectiveness of their platform, to persuade voters, and to increase the salience of policy. We illustrate, using historical examples, how polarization explains why the policy stakes of elections have increased and why it led to declining quality of policy outcomes and elected candidates.

- Trust and Policy Capacity (with Dana Sisak)

Abstract: We investigate the determinants of states' policy capacity, defined as the ability of states to craft effective policies. Our model shows that the interaction between politicians' implementation decisions and bureaucrats' motivation to design effective policies can lead to the coexistence of high-trust and low-trust equilibria. Without electoral concerns, politicians favor high-trust equilibria and hire capable bureaucrats. In a polarized society, electoral concerns may prompt more policy-skeptical politicians to appoint less capable bureaucrats to diminish policy capacity and ensure low-trust equilibria. This strategy shifts future implementation decisions in favor of interventionist politicians. Moreover, it reduces voters' demand for interventionist decision-making.

Work in Progress

- An Empirically Inspired Theory of Turnout and Voting. With Rubén Poblete Cazenave.

Abstract: Why another theoretical model of voter behavior? First, recent empirical studies provide new insights into the drivers of people's turnout and vote decisions. Second, existing voter models predominantly focus on turnout decisions and often ignore vote decisions. This leads to inconsistent explanations of observed voting patterns. We build on Harbaugh (1996), who theoretically explored social image concerns as drivers of turnout decisions. Our model explains turnout, lying about abstaining, and vote decisions. Its predictions are consistent with studies on the effects of information about candidates in slums in a large city in India. Furthermore, the model casts new light on recent studies on expressive and strategic voting in elections in France and Germany. Finally, the model yields a variety of new testable predictions.

- Coalition Formation in Dutch Municipalities. With Lotte Swank and Joes de Natris.

Publications (1999-)